Šta je  arhitektonski  koncept? „Koncept“ kod Deleza i „projekt“ kod Аjzenmana by Vesnić, Snežana
FILOZOFIJA I DRUŠTVO XXVIII (4), 2017.
1122




Received:  21.09.2017. – Accepted: 10.11.2017.
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What Is an Architectural Concept? 
The “Concept” of Deleuze and “Project” of Eisenman
Abstract Two great theories – one in philosophy, one in architecture – emerge 
nearly simultaneously in the twentieth century: Gilles Deleuze’s understanding 
of the “concept,” that is, defining philosophy as an activity that produces concepts, 
and Peter Eisenman’s idea of the “project” as a platform, “position,” or “theory” of 
an architect. My intention is to suggest and problematize the idea of the concept 
as “capacity” or “potentiality” implying the production of a multitude of “concepts” 
or varying “conceptions.” Deleuze’s great significance for architecture of this 
century allowed for the construction of the “concept” as “author’s potential,” the 
source of activity and creative architectural acts. An architectural concept, determined 
in the course of the text, and thanks to which architectural terminology is redefined, 
could potentially be quite useful in philosophy and theory of the subject. 
Keywords: notion, concept, conception, architecture, philosophy
We had never stopped asking this question previously, and we already had 
the answer, which has not changed: philosophy is the art of forming, in-
venting, and fabricating concepts.1 (Deleuze 1994a: 2)
Philosophy as the art of production of concepts, in the sense suggested by 
Deleuze-Guattari, is projected completely and consistently into architec-
ture. Allow me to paraphrase a sentence section: “architecture is the art of 
forming, inventing, and fabricating architectural concepts.” Both clauses of 
this claim carry equal importance: “is the art” and “forming, inventing, and 
fabricating concepts.” Although at first glance the two phrases achieve bal-
ance (of the claim), they actually problematize both the method and the pres-
ence of the subject. However, not all creation is art, nor does all art produce 
“concepts.” Therefore, the claim that the creation of concepts is art implies 
that the concept is the product only of a special act or such “creative” ac-
tivity that allows for or enables the possibility of concepts. The idea of for-
mation, construction or production of concepts clearly points to the exis-
tence of a subject, through whose subjective action something is produced. 
Deleuze-Guattari thematize the potential of the subject or subjectivity by 
1 “Et nous n’avions pas cessé de le faire précédemment, et nous avions déjà la réponse qui n’a 
pas varié: la philosophie est l’art de former, d’inventer, de fabriquer des concepts.” (Deleuze 
1991: 8).
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constituting personages conceptuelles – figures that contribute to defining con-
cepts. (Deleuze 1991: 8) In the first place, it is the philosopher who offers 
the possibility of making concepts: “the philosopher is the concept’s friend; 
he is potentiality of the concept… philosophy is the discipline that involves 
creating concepts.” (Deleuze 1994a: 5) Thus, the philosopher “has the capac-
ity” to create concepts, making the philosopher “the potential” for the exis-
tence of the concept. Aside from the conditionality of subject and process, 
Deleuze-Guatari’s second significant intention is to relativize the concept in 
relation to the problem before it. Concepts in philosophy take the place of 
the problem, and as such, every concept refers to the problem to which it is 
tied and which gives it meaning. (Deleuze 1994a: 16-17) The procedure al-
lows the concept to simultaneously recognize and resolve the problem, while 
paradoxically, the problem itself ‘holds’ and articulates the concept the entire 
time. In such a way, the concept takes up the position between creative ac-
tivity of the subject and the very problem that it (the concept) problematizes 
while also creating it. Deleuze explained at length, drawing on Bergson, how, 
in establishing a problem, the problem is also invented, and that the basic 
goal is not the solution of a problem, but its discovery, that is, its formula-
tion. (Deleuze 2001: 7) The third important characteristic of the concept is 
the multiplicity in unity. The concept is a ‘whole’. Although fragmentary by 
nature (Deleuze 1994a: 16)2 – regardless of how well organized its elements 
or in what processes of dissolution or mitosis they end up – the concept al-
ways has the capacity to totalize its parts. The potential acquired through a 
specific fragmentation of the whole allows the concept to take place in the (in)
consistent unity of philosophy. Which is what Deleuze-Guattari declare the 
plan of immanence (le plan d’immanence). Finally, and I feel most importantly, 
Deleuze-Guattari offer the concept the possibility to alter its identity, that 
is, the capacity to transform from the role of subject into the role of object:
In fact, if the other person is identified with a special object, it is now 
only the other subject as it appears to me; and if we identify it with an-
other subject, it is me who is the other person as I appear to that subject. 
(Deleuze 1994a: 16)
It is important to note here the possible architectural value of this idea of 
translation and transformation of the subjective into the object and object 
into subject. The comprehension of the problem through the concept could 
have a purely functional architectural value in initiating the desire for the ob-
ject. Although at first glance, for Deleuze-Guattari the relation of the sub-
ject (freedom) and the object (finitude) is not central, there is nevertheless a 
certain intention for the presence of the subject and a sort of ‘expectation’ of 
2  “The concept is a whole because it totalizes its components, but it is a fragmentary 
whole.” (Deleuze 1994a: 16)
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object (in absence). The question is then twofold: how is the concept created 
(and what creates it) and what does the concept create (and how)?
The “Concept”: Deleuze’s “Project”
Despite potential pitfalls and reservations, I will try to distinguish ‘notion’ 
(Begriff) and ‘concept’ (concept, Konzept).3 There is no philosophical or lin-
guistic precisely defined relation between notion and concept. I insist on 
the existence of their difference because it seems to me that its elucidation 
could also reframe numerous philosophical doubts. Christian Wolff defined 
notion (Begriff) as a representation of a thing in thought (“Was ein Begrif ist. 
Einen Begrif nenne ich eine jede Vorstellung einer Sache in unseren Gedancken”). 
(Wolff 1713: 123) I draw on Wolff because by designating ‘notion’ (Begriff) 
as representation of things in thought, indirectly he gives a simplified distinc-
tion between ‘notion’ and ‘concept’: notion is exhausted in representations, 
images, cognition or drawings. 
The problem with concept arises due to its double role. First, concepts con-
stitute philosophy, in which they also simultaneously emerge, thus establish-
ing internal relations that then later reflect beyond philosophy. Second, con-
cepts examine a comprehensive configuration, a framework of fundamental 
elements and ‘philosophical configurations’. A theory of concepts is compli-
cated by unresolved traditional distinctions between concept/Begriff and 
concept/conception. ‘Concept’ derives from the Latin conceptus, concipiere, 
allowing for concept to always be tied to creation of mind (literally, concep-
tus is the product of interior pregnancy). The semantic base (con-capere means 
together to take) points to the possibility of joining into a single whole that 
leads to generalization. In this sense, the meanings of ‘concept’ and ‘notion’ 
begin to overlap and correspond one to another. This etymology points to 
the formation of a group from a multiplicity of elements (an entirely Deleuz-
ian idea) into a single whole with a determined degree of generality. Perhaps 
the ultimate (mis)understanding of the concept lies precisely in its intrinsic 
semantic-etymological (a)symmetrical ambivalence. Alterations of the con-
cept, both in the sense of meaning and with regards to action, open complex 
fields of transgression and a morphogenesis of concepts.
3  Colloquially, the German verb begreiffen designates an understanding on an intel-
lectual level – the meaning of the intellectual ‘reach’ of a thing or idea (begrieffen includes 
echoes of the verb greifen, from whence English ultimately derives grasp) and points to 
an approach of ‘encompassing’ things or ideas. The word Begriff is interpreted in various 
ways in philosophy, and transformed asymmetrically in epistemologies. Gottlob Frege 
directed the meaning of this word to the psychological, but still kept a portion of the 
original meaning: “Frege maintains a naturalness in the use of Begriff that is probably lost 
in later English translations and the most contemporary uses of ‘concept’.” (P. Büttgen, 
M. Crépon and S. Laugier in Cassin 2014:93).
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Although the issue of translating or carrying the ‘concept’ into ‘Begriff’ var-
ies in Kant’s and Hegel’s uses of the words,4 the relationship of ‘concept’ and 
‘idea’ seems much simpler. It seems to me that in developing a strategic re-
lation between the notions of difference and repetition, Deleuze gave a par-
allel interpretation (or simultaneously developed a parallel concept) of the 
transition of the idea into concept. 
In every case repetition is difference without a concept. But in one case, 
the difference is taken to be only external to the concept; it is a difference 
between objects represented by the same concept, falling into the indif-
ference of space and time. In the other case, the difference is internal to 
the Idea; it unfolds as pure movement, creative of a dynamic space and 
time which correspond to the Idea. The first repetition is repetition of 
the Same, explained by the identity of the concept or representation; the 
second includes difference, and includes itself in the alterity of the Idea, 
in the heterogeneity of an ‘a-presentation’. One is negative, occurring by 
default in the concept; the other affirmative, occurring by excess in the 
Idea. (Deleuze 1994b: 23)
Such a projection of the idea and concept – a construction of one (concept) 
and other (idea) – is significant (and not only architecturally) because it ex-
plains how a concept produces objects that recur, whereupon both the ob-
ject and repetition are determined by the identity of the concept, while the 
alteration of the Idea leads to interior difference (concept). The resolution 
of this relation presented in Difference and Repetition, the grounding of the 
concept and its role in philosophy, culminates in What is Philosophy? with a 
twofold, radical, and precise theory of the concept and theory of philoso-
phy. The repletion and beauty of these theories, paradoxically, is located in 
their ephemerality: any definition of the concept melts into a definition of 
philosophy, allowing, in turn, the creation of new concepts. 
Although emerging from multiplicity, the first significant characteristic of 
the concept is its wholeness, which, for Deleuze-Guattari, originates from 
its character (or strength) to render the portions inseparable within itself. 
4  Colloquially, the German verb “begreifen” designates an understanding of intellectu-
al order or an intellectual understanding of a thing or idea. For Kant, Begriff had, in a 
strict sense, a function of understanding, while Hegel gives an entirely different inter-
pretation of the word. For him, Begriff is an independent figure of knowledge moving 
towards absolute knowledge. Frege brings a psychological redefinition: “The term 
“concept” (Begriff) has several uses; it is sometimes taken in the psychological sense, and 
sometimes in the logical sense, and perhaps also in a confused acceptation that mixes the 
two.” (P. Büttgen, M. Crépon and S. Laugier in Cassin 2014: 93) The various interpretations 
of Begriff and begreifen in Kant and Hegel can be seen in grammatical particularities: the 
nominative, Begriff and verb begreifen can be found in Kant, while Hegel uses the singular 
and plural Begriffe. Kant examines the limits of the verb begreifen, while Hegel is interest-
ed in the noun. 
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Like the wholeness (of physical form) as understood by the architect Peter 
Eisenman, it is not a matter of a single element reflecting the simple rep-
resentation of the whole or of unity, but rather the wholeness determining 
the relative size of the portions within itself. The specific character of the 
concept is developed in actions of unification of a fragmented multitude of 
individual wholes or elements. The identity of its endo-consistency simulta-
neously sustains a dependence (passion of belonging to the whole) and inde-
pendence of the elements (resistance to joining others). There is a cohesion 
of diverse parts or elements: by achieving the status of the individual, they 
all constitute a whole. Based on this position and fact that the concept is cre-
ated, we mark the place “of overlap, condensation and accumulation of its 
own parts” – the place of achievement of interior strength, representing the 
first place of stability of concept. It would appear that the concept becomes 
embodied or is achieved in bodies. The crucial place where we encounter 
“the intensities” – true evidence of the existence of concepts – are precisely 
those places or positions, or projections of concepts, which are not identical 
with its original state. (Deleuze 1994a: 21)
We encounter an analogous situation in architecture, since the unified con-
cept, as purely original intellectual content (an idea of an object, project or 
object), is never entirely equal or in agreement with what it implies. Fol-
lowing Eisenman then, although conceptual, architecture is intentionally 
directed toward an object, since the conceptual aspect of architecture is ul-
timately thought through the object that embodies (actualizes) the concept. 
It is important to point out that in architecture, the object is not only what 
has been built, but also includes the “idea of the object,” as an equally objec-
tive reality of the architectural concept – it contains both the conceptual and 
the implicitly physical presence. More specifically, a concept in architecture 
“materializes” in different formations – in the idea of the object, in the ide-
al object, the project or the material object. According to Eisenman, it is im-
portant for the conceptual aspect to be visible, regardless whether material 
or immaterial. It therefore seems to me important to establish a parallel be-
tween Deleuze-Guattari’s realization of concepts in bodies and Eisenman’s 
necessity of object. We can say that the objectivization (or transposition) of 
concepts into (philosophical) bodies and (architectural) objects determines 
its absolutism and relativism, in the sense presented by Deleuze-Guattari. At 
once absolute and relative, the concept is determined by its manifold con-
sistency, simultaneously positing and creating both itself and its objects. In 
architecture, absolutism of the concept determines how it is positioned and 
how it exists in the ‘outside world’, that is, how it is contextualized.
For Deleuze, the concept is a singularity because it is always specifically and 
individually a philosophical creation. (Deleuze 1994a: 7) On the other hand, 
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for Eisenman, singularity always assumes the other, the different. (Eisenman 
1993: 40) It is a unified individuality with the capacity and material for au-
thentic objectivization. What is important is that the concept as singularity is 
not only unified, but that with its authentic constitutive power it determines 
a unified architectural reality. In other words, the identity of the concept is 
exhausted in the possibility of self-positing – “[it] posits itself in itself – it is 
a self-positing.” (Deleuze 1994: 11) This is the first reality of the concept: in 
its independent and necessary self-positing, the concept precisely becomes 
functional and ‘engaged’; in this activity it constitutes (a philosophical and/or 
architectural) reality. The simultaneous self-positing within “itself” and dis-
closure or revelation of the subjective through the production of the object es-
sentially allows for various existences of concepts in its objective reflections.
“Project”: the “Concept” of Peter Eisenman
I would like to reconstruct what ought to be Peter Eisenman’s “concept of the 
project” by using an analogy with three particularities of Deleuze’s “concept:” 
relational question of the subject and problem, (post)structure: diagram and 
idea, and third, the fragmentary multiplicity of the whole. My aim is to con-
nect Deleuze’s plan of immanence and Eisenman’s meta-project, for which I 
will use a mediator, Corbusier’s idea of the plan as generator.
Two “Eisenman presences,” both real, the theoretical authority and profes-
sional practical activity in the studio, institutionalize one another within the 
(a)symmetric frame of a single architectural ‘figure’. The question regarding 
“the Work and the Project” or “the Work against Project” is analogous to the 
paradox of the relation of architectural deed and project of Peter Eisenman. 
My question is whether it is possible to think the work as an architectural 
work, practice or material architectural object without the project or idea of 
the project? More specifically, is the idea of the project consistently interpret-
ed, perceived or felt throughout Eisenman’s work? An attempt at grasping 
the concept in ‘the work’ and/or ‘the projects’ (of Peter Eisenman) is a chal-
lenge of ‘gleaning’ (conceptualizing) the overall wholeness of an architectural 
philosophy and practice, of a single subject and myriad projects. The issue, 
then, above all, is the subject. It is clear that, just like Deleuze’s conceptual 
personnage that allows for concepts, Eisenman also speaks of architects who 
“have a project” or who “practice a project.” The way in which he demon-
strates this is a specific diagrammatic process that moves the subject: “The 
diagrammatic process will never run without some physical input from a 
subject…The diagram does not generate in and of itself.” (Eisenman 2010: 
103) Such an operation implies the freedom to insist on the difference be-
tween the ‘phenomenological’ and ‘conceptual’, in which phenomenology is 
left to deal with the literal figuration of architectural reality, thus directing 
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the project as conceptual to deal with metamorphosis. Architecture explicitly 
insists on ideas that come to be built or realized.5
How can we define project within the philosophical ‘order’ and architectur-
al ‘thought’ of Peter Eisenman? Project is essentially what has a concept. In 
order to understand, but then also problematize Eisenman’s ostensibly sim-
ple concept – the concept of the project – it is necessary to distinguish the no-
tions of ‘project’ and ‘design’, and thus attempt to reconstruct the potential 
of these ‘protocols’ to completely overcome their ontological status. Diseg-
no or design is one of the main notions of Renaissance art theory, meaning 
at once design and project, drawing and intention, discovery, the idea in the 
speculative sense, and refers exclusively to intellectual activity. In the mid-
18th century, the French word dessein split into dassin and dessein, that is, 
‘design’ and ‘drawing’ (the arts of dessin were taught, but not of dessein.) ( J. 
Lichtenstein 2014: 224-226)6. Disegno, then, is a notion that, in addition to 
‘drawing’, which is equated with representation and the sign (disegno), also 
encompasses the project, intention and thought. The notion of ‘design’ as 
a unit of project or as drawing, meaning as mere translation of the notions 
of disegno and dessein, ultimately guides Anthony Ashley Cooper, 1st Earl of 
Shaftsbury. According to Shaftsbury, design serves to form the project and 
“…that after I had conceived my notion such as you see it upon paper, I was 
not concerned with this, but fell directly to work; and by practice, and by 
hand of master-painter brought it into practice, and formed a real design.” 
(Shaftesbury 1712: 396) The specific origin and character of the word design 
as an intellectual project or thought will in later iterations and modifications 
move further away from its Italian root disegno, moving toward drawing as 
procedure or representation, ignoring the specific form of thinking that is 
accompanied in the execution of design or the realization through design.7 
Historians and art theorists have attempted to preserve the notion of disegno 
without translating the word, leaving it the meaning assigned by Raphael or 
Vasari.8 Giorgio Vasari emphasized that aside from drawing (as the manual 
5  The conceptual in architecture serves to enable the transfer from the virtual to the 
actual, from the illusory to the real. The ultimate aim of architecture is to identically see 
and conceptually think an architectural object. It is for this reason that Manfredo Tafuri 
impresses upon Eisenman the necessity of building: “Peter, you have to build because 
ideas that are not built are simply ideas that are not built.” (Bojanić, Djokić 2017: 12)
6  From which time these two semantic fields, unified in disegno, come to diverge in 
French, as well as English and German.
7  Many languages today contain an analogy of use of design, which refers to the draw-
ing, plan or project in the purely material sense, but it does not refer to intention or in-
tellectual project. 
8  Using the notion of ‘ciconscrizione’ to designate the contour (which is to be found in 
Alberti), historians and art theorists underscore that design is not merely drawing, but a 
mental representation, the form that represents thought and the imagination of the artist. 
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expression), design ought to reflect the artist’s philosophy. He believed that 
the artist ought to possess a clear “conception of idea,” which would be the 
basis of what the artist described in their work. “Conception” – for Vasari 
concetto – is a philosophical idea that stands behind any work of art  (Vasari 
1586: 490) and emerges through grasping (cognizione) all the relations, the 
whole and its parts, but also all the parts among themselves. 
It is intriguing that, despite the deep understanding and interest in the Re-
naissance, Eisenman adopts the French-English tradition of the notion of 
‘design’, which describes, displays, stylizes and simplifies. Paradoxically or 
not, Eisenman adopts ‘project’ (the notion of more severe origin), building 
his architectural philosophy around it. The origin of the word ‘project’ is tied 
to the blueprint, the schema, issuing from the Latin proiectum (something 
thrown forth, stretch out), but also meaning what is thought out, a men-
tal plan with a function of specific exploration. Apart from the intention of 
remaining in the domain of purely architectural terminology, it seems that 
Eisenman’s use of the ‘project’ is an intuitive reflection of some of Derrida’s 
conceptions, emerging in turn from his reading of Husserl’s ideas regard-
ing the “origins of geometry.” For Husserl, thought must first exist as proj-
ect, and then as realized: “Successful realization of a project is, for the acting 
subject, self-evidence; in this self-evidence, what has been realized is there, 
originaliter, as itself.” (Derrida 1978: 159-160) Husserl connects the process 
of realization of a project – process of projecting with the successful reali-
zation of meaning and sense that dwells within the subject – “the subject of 
the inventor.” (Derrida 1978: 160) The ‘project’ is what gives the subjective 
“originaliter” a wholeness of thought, which will, in the very next instance, 
appear as a new form in the entirety of its content. Similarly, for Eisenman, 
the idea as the (possible) original, initiates the creation of mental space as a 
necessity for the development of an original conceptual structure:
A conceptual structure is that aspect of the visible form, whether it is an 
idea, in a drawing, or in a building, which is intentionally put in the form to 
provide access to the inner form or universal formal relationships. (Eisen-
man 2004: 15)
The question of the project for Eisenman is the question of intention in archi-
tecture. The conceptual base of the project authentically places the idea, creating 
internal relations, as well as defining the overall specific context in which the 
idea ‘materializes’ as conception, and not merely as design or else pure techni-
cal production of the project. The second question of the project, within Derri-
da’s thematization of continuity, is the essential question of contingency of the 
‘new’ in “new project,”9 and the simultaneous integration of all that came before. 
9  “…a scientific stage is not only a sense which “in fact comes later,” but the integration 
of the whole earlier sense in a new project.” (Derrida 1978:60)
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Also, what is true of the Living Present is true of what supposes it as its 
ground, the historic present; the latter always refers more or less imme-
diately to the totality of a past which inhabits it and which always appears 
under the general form of a project. At every moment each historic total-
ity is a cultural structure animated by a project which is an “idea.” (Der-
rida 1978: 58)
Finally, the third question of the project is a question of the pure ‘philosoph-
ic act’: for Eisenman, it is organized in the construction of the diagram that 
permeates the complete intellectual map of (architectural) thought. The di-
agram precedes any beginning of (architectural) activity or act, any creation, 
that is, any reality. Through transgression, overstepping and deconstruction 
of vital architectural ‘maps’, the methodological capacity of the diagram is 
to generate new theoretical and practical platforms of the individual proj-
ect, as well as architecture as a whole. In that sense, Deleuze’s idea of su-
perimposition, in contrast with Eisenman’s conception of superposition of 
the diagram (Eisenman 2010: 96), seems to allow for a conclusion that the 
nature of deconstructing diagram of (architectural-philosophical maps) al-
ways seeks to be twofold.10 Deleuze’s definition of the diagram as a flexible 
set of connections between forces (Eisenman 2010: 92-96) coincides with 
what Eisenman calls the architectural interior and meaning. We are dealing 
here with the establishing – with each new project – of a dynamic relation 
between (visible) space and (invisible) relations, amorphous, formless matter, 
unformalized and incomplete functions. Resisting finality and completion, 
the diagram itself generates new fragments and new “diagrams of diagrams” 
(Vidler 2006: 153), such as Corbusier’s villas that emerge from the Dom-Ino 
diagrams, while at once sharpening and effacing it with “their own diagram.” 
These processes result in complex (manifold) conceptual (post)structures, the 
basis for any individual and new process of projecting. 
Eisenman builds the (conceptual) whole around the idea of a project, whose 
conceptualization enables him ‘to have a project’. ‘Not having a project’, does 
not only mean not being animated by concept, but also not having ‘a desire for 
project’, not having a platform for the ‘possibility of project’. The significance 
of the (architectural) project is essential for its power to use critical reasoning 
of the discipline in order to shape the world, and, according to Eisenman, an 
architect who “has a project,” defines the world around him with that project, 
as opposed to an architect who “does not have a project” and allows himself 
to be defined by the world. 
10  According to Deleuze, the diagram is different to the structure (Eisenman 2010: 
93): “A diagram is the spatialisation of selective abstraction and/or reduction of concept 
or phenomenon. In other words, a diagram is the architecture of an ideal or entity.” 
(Garcia 2010: 18)
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From a meta-position Eisenman introduces the construction of ‘meta-proj-
ect’, as the meta-formation of continuous creation of an architectural philos-
ophy. (Eisenman, internet) They at once form the discipline and historical 
order. By pure transformation of reality and using critical mechanisms, they 
posit new concepts and conceptions of architecture and the world it (archi-
tecture) defines.11 However, even though he places it primarily in a histori-
cal context, it would appear that the significance of Eisenman’s introduction 
of the meta-project is an insistence on a meta-position of the architectur-
al discipline as invention and positing of the new, what is to come, what is 
awaited, or even what we desire architecture to be. Part of the ‘project’ that 
“[opens] history to invention, which is in fact what the basic part of project is 
about for me,” (Eisenman 2017: 161) also opens and invests the very project 
as potential for the creation of the desire for the new. Similarly, Corbusier 
saw the potential of the ‘plan’ to overcome (spatial) explanations of tradi-
tional ‘geometry’: “The great problems of tomorrow, dictated by collective 
necessities, put the questions of ‘plan’ in a new form.”12 (Le Corbusier 1993: 
46) Corbusier’s plan is a formation that shapes the discipline: “a plan calls 
for the most active imagination. It calls for the most severe discipline also. 
The plan is what determines everything; it is the decisive moment.”13 (Le 
Corbusier 1993: 48) In the same way, Eisenman’s project defines the world. 
The plan, a strict abstraction, is what ‘determines and fixes ideas’. Corbus-
ier’s ‘plan’, Eisenman’s ‘meta-project’ and Deleuze ‘plan of immanence’ are 
all formations through which the concept and concepts shape the world and 
architectural and/or philosophical reality:
The plane of immanence is neither a concept nor the concept of all con-
cepts. If one were to be confused with the other there would be nothing 
to stop concepts from forming a single one or becoming universals and 
losing their singularity, and the plane would also lose its openness. Phi-
losophy is a constructivism, and constructivism has two qualitatively dif-
ferent complementary aspects: the creation of concepts and the laying out 
of a plane (Deleuze 1994a: 35-36)
11  Eisenman’s six meta-projects: Vitruvius’ 10 books, Leon Battista Alberti, Claude 
Perrault (with his French translation of Vitruvius), Giovanni Battista Piranesi, synthesis 
of disciplinary theory and history at the French Academy in the first decades of the 19th 
century, and finally, Corbusier’s project of autonomy and new conception with the Dom-
Ino House: prefabrication, repetition, recurrence, new awareness of what modern life 
could be. (Eisenman, internet)
12  “Le plan est le générateur. Sans plan, il y a désordre, arbitraire. Le plan porte en lui l’essence 
de la sensation. Les grands problèmes de demain, dictés par des nécessités collectives, posent à 
nouveau la question du plan. La vie moderne demande, attend un plan nouveau pour la maison 
et pour la ville.” (Le Corbusier 1925: 33)
13  “Le plan nécessite la plus active imagination. Il nécessite aussi la plus sévère discipline. Le 
plan est la détermination du tout; il est le moment décisif.” (Le Corbusier 1925: 37)
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For Corbusier, the plan is the generator. “The plan is the key of evolution.” 
(Le Corbusier 1993: 45) Deleuze-Guattari’s “plan of immanence” is a pure 
generator, much like Corbusier’s. Deleuze speaks of the idea ‘disciplined’ by 
the plan, allowing it to become executable and coherent, just like Eisenman 
speaks of conceptualization of the idea that will acquire the possibility of 
realization with the project. Thus emerge projects of architecture and archi-
tectural concepts. The plan or project become abstract thought architectural 
situations, and their functioning, like a medium, allows for the transposition 
of the idea into a physical model of reality. If projects or meta-projects define 
the world and discipline, concepts determine what Eisenman calls ‘architec-
tural philosophy’. 
Conclusion: “Architectural Concept”  
and “Philosophical Project”
So, the question of philosophy is the singular point where concept and 
creation are related to each other. (Deleuze 1994a: 11)14
The problem of architecture is posited at the point of connection of archi-
tectural concept and creation. Architectural creation is grounded in archi-
tectural conceptual thought, which in turn arises from architectural creation. 
This is an architectonic dislocation of the architectural subject and object. 
Eisenman wrote about the complex architectural act of dislocation, that is, the 
particularity of architecture as the discipline that, paradoxically, always dis-
locates what it has just located, above all its own object. Without calling into 
question the presence of the concept or conceptual, Eisenman defines the 
particularity of the architectural discipline through the ‘object’: the architec-
tural idea implies the presence of an object, that is, “demands the idea of an 
object presence,” (Eisenman 2004: 15) regardless whether the architectural 
object is material or immaterial. On the other hand, Deleuze designated all of 
philosophy through concepts it creates through which it is created. Creation 
and self-positing of concepts are the two things, according to Deleuze, that 
make the concept powerful. Much as this Deleuzian reciprocity that exists 
between creation and self-positing of the concept (that is, the more it is cre-
ated, the more it is self-posited), the entire architectural design capacity of the 
concept turns the interior into the exterior (of architecture). The strength of 
the concept, in other words, is reflected in its potential objective projection. 
In the case of architecture, the more precise, authentic, compact the con-
cept, the greater the intensity of its dynamic positioning. The condition for 
the creation of concepts in architecture, that Deleuzian free creative activity, 
which allows for the self-positing in itself, independently and necessarily, is in 
14  “Ainsi donc la question de la philosophie est le point singulier où le concept et la création 
se rapportent l’un à l’autre.” (Deleuze 1991: 16)
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fact occupied by the desire for the subjectively idealized object. Architectural 
concepts are thus creations that generate moments when “the most subjec-
tive will be the most objective.” (Deleuze 1994a: 11) In fact, the concept, in 
a twofold, two-sided, ambivalent manner, between two subjects, seeks out 
the moments when its subjective and objective reality both become illusory.15 
The concept is created, it is the product of creative activity, but this creation 
is not a purpose in itself, just as the ‘concept-object’ is not the origin of this 
process. The essential value of the ‘concept’ for architecture (as for philoso-
phy) is its pure creative, inventive potential for new creation, production of 
new concepts and new conceptions. If we take potentiality as the potential not 
to cross into the real, the actual,16 if we determine it temporally, then this ‘mo-
ment’ for something to be realized or actualized becomes the architectural 
(perhaps philosophical too) creative ground. It is this that constitutes the dif-
ference between project and architectural concept: project is the realization 
(of the concept or a portion thereof); architectural concept contains thought, 
thinking and ‘multiplicity’ that always surpasses its realization or objectiv-
ization (into another concept, conception, project or object). The content of 
the concept always allows for the possibility – the time and space – not to be 
actualized, not to pass into the finite. Eisenman’s ‘formation of the project’ is 
always a project of something, defining specific spatial and temporal condi-
tions (definition in architecture means finitude, actualization, transposition 
into form…), while architecture necessarily implies constant shifting of bor-
ders, not only ‘defining worlds’, that is, reality. Architectural concepts create 
the very potential for the new and authentic, although always with a critical 
relationship towards the past and the extant. The concept is the invention 
of the problem, posing the question and the problem, while the project is 
one of the formations of the operationalization of the concept. The concept 
can and must appear and disappear, without necessarily being realized in a 
project. The project in Eisenman’s sense must always have a specific spatial 
and temporal context, while the architectural concept defines all that could 
comprise context. The potentiality of the architectural concept always sur-
passes its own ‘materialization’. The ‘project’ for Eisenman implies a kind of 
finitude or complete actualization (like an ‘idea in conceptualization’, ‘con-
cept in diagram’). In a sense, the project is fulfilled in itself, binding itself, 
15  According to Theodor Adorno, “the separation of object and subject are both real 
and illusory.” (Ruth Grof 2014)
16  According to Giorgio Agamben, potentiality, following the Aristotelian tradition 
of conception, can be differentiated into ‘existing potentiality’ that is different from 
‘generic potentiality’. Potential does not only exist in the actual: “[…].for Aristotle, [it] will 
be the key figure of potentiality, the mode of its existence as potentiality. It is a potenti-
ality that is not simply the potential to do this or, the thing but potential to not-do, po-
tential not to pass into actuality.” (Agamben 1999:79)
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spatially and temporally, to a specific context. For Eisenman, the “project has 
nothing to do with looking forward. It has to do with an attitude towards 
space and time that is much more akin with poststructuralist thought and 
linguistic thought than it is with certain aspects of phenomenology.” (Eisen-
man 2017: 161) The architectural concept achieves specific relationships 
with the spatial and temporal dimensions in which it appears, making it al-
ways ontologically directed at the past, ever holding on to the capacity to not 
pass completely into reality, thus generating what we yet expect to appear 
in the future. In that sense, ‘the project’ can be a form of actualization of the 
architectural concept, or else, it is its first actualization. In this way, the ar-
chitectural concept has the capacity to generate architectural conceptions. 
The directedness of the architectural concept towards its own (conceptual) 
projection in architectural objects, reveals to us a particular closeness between 
architecture and philosophy. Much as architecture, philosophy is ultimately 
directed at ‘its objects’ – concepts. When possibility becomes real in the true 
sense of the word, the architectural concept is fulfilled in a new concept, in 
conceptions or architectural object; whereas the philosophic concept actual-
izes in a new philosophical theory, the new virtual, in which the virtual is not 
something lacking in reality (Deleuze). Thus, philosophy operationalizes the 
possibility of defining the world and reality through ‘philosophical projects’, 
which are, like architectural ones, essentially paradigmatic, hierarchical, and 
referential. Philosophical projects organize concepts, plans, platforms, the-
ories, thus ‘liberating always new forms of thought and new combinations 
of concepts. Architectural concepts reconstruct particular intellectual acts, 
thus generating the concept and new conceptions. The essence of Eisenman’s 
‘project’ is the grounding of architecture as a discipline, which uses the con-
cept of the project to define the reality and world around it. The architectural 
concept as ‘capacity’ or as ‘potentiality’ creates authentic and new values of 
space, time, but also thought as such. 
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Snežana Vesnić
Šta je arhitektonski koncept?
„Koncept“ kod Deleza i „projekt“ kod Аjzenmana
Apstrakt
Dve velike teorije – jedna u filozofiji, jedna u arhitekturi – pojavljuju se skoro si-
multano u dvadesetom veku: Žil Delezovo razumevanje „koncepta“, odnosno, 
definisanje filozofije kao aktivnosti koja „proizvodi“ koncepte, i Piter  Аjzenmanova 
ideja „projekta“ kao platforme, „stanovišta“, ili „teorije“ (jednog) arhitekte. Moja 
namera je da predložim i problematizujem ideju koncepta kao „kapaciteta“ ili 
„potencijalnosti“, implicirajući proizvodnju mnoštva „koncepata“ ili „koncepcija“. 
Delezov veliki značaj za arhitekturu ovog veka omogućio je konstrukciju „kon-
cepta“ kao „autorskog potencijalа“, izvora aktivnosti i stvaralačkih arhitektonskih 
akata. Arhitektonski koncept, koji se odredjuje u ovom tekstu, i zahvaljujući kome 
se redefiniše arhitektonska terminologija, potencijalno može da bude veoma ko-
ristan u filozofiji i teoriji subjekta.
Ključne reči: pojam, koncept, koncepcija, arhitektura, filozofija.
